Achieving Strategic Value in a High Tech Business Sale

In a series of short videos we discuss approaches we use to drive strategic value on behalf of our technology company business sellers. In this one we explore the technique of restating our client's financials using the pricing power of the potential acquiring company. 

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To learn more about our services for technology business sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Technology Business Sales - Animal Spirits Create Strategic Value

One of our short videos where we discuss our top strategies for driving strategic value in our Technology Focused M&A practice. There is no more effective approach to driving up your tech company selling price that to get buying companies in a competitive bidding process.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To learn more about our services for technology business sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To learn more about our services for technology business sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

IT Services M&A Deal Announcement

Base 36, A New England Based IT Recruiting, Consulting, and Outsourcing Services Firm 

Has Been Acquired By 

Compunnel Software Group, An Information Technology Staff Augmentation Company serving Fortune 500 companies and large enterprises.

MidMarket Capital advises companies in the information technology  industry. MidMarket Capital, Inc. principal Dave Kauppi provided investment banking services to Base 36 and its principal throughout this transaction.

There was considerable buyer demand, so if you are considering your exit, the timing is favorable. Please let me know if I should contact you. Thanks for your consideration

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To find out more about our services click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

In a Business Sale, the Buyer Has the Upper Hand (Part 1 of a 3 Part Article)

We just had this article published on Divestopedia. https://www.divestopedia.com/2/7790/sale-process/negotiation/in-a-business-sale-the-buyer-has-the-upper-hand-part-1

Unless your company is one of those must-have, breakthrough, technology companies with buyers crawling all over you, you are subject to a process that greatly favors the business buyer. This is part one of a three-part series that will identify the natural advantages that business buyers bring to the table before the transaction process even starts. Parts two and three will focus on the marketing, due diligence and contract negotiation process. I will discuss the buyer's constant attack on transaction value and approaches you can use to hold your ground against this formidable opponent.

Buyer Experience

If the buyer is a private equity group, they buy companies for a living. They will have acquired dozens of companies prior to entering the competition for your business. If it is an industry buyer, they likely have an individual or department whose sole function is to look for business acquisitions. For most business sellers, this is their first and only rodeo. What you don't know will definitely hurt you, or at least cost you.

Buyers have an experienced deal team. Do not go it alone. Hire an experienced M&A advisor to help you. Not only for the packaging and marketing of your company, but for defending the value you thought you were going to receive at closing. Make sure you get an experienced deal attorney at the contract stage to counteract the incredibly one-sided agreement that the buyer's team will present.

Buyer Choices

I know this will come as a shock, but yours is not the only business the buyer is seriously evaluating for acquisition. For private equity buyers, they generally look at about 100 companies for each one they buy. They will have several deals in the queue, along with yours, to give them plenty of options, to leverage one against the other, and to reduce emotional attachment to any one deal.

Seller Choices

The seller needs to identify several qualified buyers and process these buyers in parallel. If the seller tries to sell his/her company on his/her own, he/she can usually only process one buyer at a time in a serial process because of all his/her other duties running the company. If a buyer knows he/she is the only buyer, count on bad behavior - inability to tie him/her down on a firm offer, missed time commitments, delays, endless information requests, and on and on. If, however, you have been able to attract multiple buyers, your negotiating position is strengthened and you can offset these buyer tactics.

Buyer Controlling the Pre-LOI Negotiation

It is not uncommon to hear something like this from an experienced buyer, "Well, last year you had a spike in profitability. I am just going to use the average of the last three years as the basis for my offer." Seller response via advisor: "It makes no sense to try to negotiate at this level. We just say, 'Feel free to slice it any way that works for you. At the end of the day, if that approach makes your offer not competitive, you will eliminate yourself from the competition.'"

A buyer getting you off the market with a loosely worded LOI that allows him/her to "interpret the terms" in his/her favor deep into the due diligence process, and a seller not counter-signing the LOI until the terms are defined, are additional considerations that can swing a transaction value significantly, and will be covered, each one individually, in part two of this series.

The key here is to recognize the great disparity in the experience levels of the normal buyer team and the unaided seller. I am not saying that doing an M&A deal is rocket science, and most of our clients have the business acumen and intelligence to run that process. The problem is that, for most sellers, this will be the one and only time they will ever go through this process. Learning on-the-fly with a multi-million dollar transaction at stake, going against an experienced buyer in a zero sum game (every dollar he/she gets is a dollar you do not get), is a very costly education.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To view our lists of buyers and sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

The #1 Cause of Middle Market M&A Deal Failures

New Article just published on Divestopedia https://www.divestopedia.com/2/7767/sale-process/negotiation/the-1-cause-of-middle-market-ma-deal-failures

I believe one of the biggest reasons for M&A deals blowing up is a poorly worded letter of intent (LOI). The standard process to solicit offers from buyers in the form of an LOI includes terms and conditions that are negotiated until one winner emerges and the seller and buyer dual sign the LOI, which is non-binding. This basically gives either party an "out" should something be discovered in the due diligence process that is not to their liking or is not as presented in the initial materials. Buyers Have the Advantage of Experience

When I say poorly worded, what I really should have said is that it is worded much to the advantage of the buyer and gives them a lot of wiggle room in how the letter is interpreted and translated into the definitive purchase agreement. The best comparison I can make is a lease agreement for an apartment. It is so one-sided in favor of the landlord and protects him/her from every conceivable problem with the renter.

Business buyers are usually very experienced and the sellers are generally first-time sellers. The buyers have probably learned some important and costly lessons from past deals and vow never to let that happen again. This is often reflected in their LOI. They also count on several dynamics from the process that are in their favor. Their deal team is experienced and is at the ready to claim that "this is a standard deal practice" or "this is the calculation according to GAAP accounting rules." They count on the seller suffering from deal fatigue after the numerous conference calls, corporate visits and the arduous production of due diligence information.

When the LOI is then translated into the definitive purchase agreement by the buyer's team, any term that is open for interpretation will be interpreted in favor of the buyer and, conversely, to the detriment of the seller. The seller can try to fight each point, and usually there are several attacks on the original value detailed in the dual-signed LOI that took the seller off the market for 45-60 days. The buyer and his/her team of experts will fight each deal term from the dispassionate standpoint on one evaluating several deals simultaneously. The seller, on the other hand, is fully emotionally committed to the result of his/her life's work. He/she is at a decided negotiating disadvantage.

The unfortunate result of this process is that the seller usually caves on most items and sacrifices a significant portion of the value that he/she thought he/she would realize from the sale. More often than not, however, the seller interprets this activity by the buyer as acting in bad faith and simply blows up the deal, only to return to the market as damaged goods. The implied message when we reconnect with previous interested buyers after going into due diligence is that the buyers found some dirty laundry in the process. These previously interested buyers may jump back in, but they generally jump back in at a transaction value lower than what they were originally willing to pay. How to Even the Playing Field

How do we stop this unfortunate buyer advantage and subsequent bad behavior? The first and most important thing we can do is to convey the message that there are several interested and qualified buyers that are very close in the process. If we are doing our job properly, we will be conveying an accurate version of the reality of the deal. The message is that we have many good options, and if you try to behave badly, we will simply cut you off and reach out to our next best choices. The second thing we can do is to negotiate the wording in the LOI to be very precise and not allow room for interpretation that can attack the value and terms we originally intended.

We will show a couple examples of LOI deal points as written by the buyer (with lots of room for interpretation) and we will counter those with examples of precise language that protects the seller.

Sample Earnout Clause Within an LOI

Buyer's Proposal

The amount will be paid using the following formula:

-75% of the value will be paid at closing

-The remaining 25% will be held as retention by the BUYERs to be paid in two equal installments at the 12 month and 24 month anniversaries, based on the following formula and with the goal of retaining at least 95% of the TTM revenue. In case at the 12 and 24 month anniversaries the TTM revenue falls below 95%, the retention amount will be adjusted based on the percentage retained. For example, if 90% of the TTM revenue is retained at 12 months, the retention value will be adjusted to 90% of the original value. In case the revenue retention falls at or below 80%, the retention value will be adjusted to $0.

Seller's Counter Proposal

The amount will be paid using the following formula:

-75% of the value will be paid at closing

-The remaining 25% will be held as earnout by the BUYERs to be paid in four equal installments at the 6, 12, 18 and 24 months anniversaries, based on the following formula:

We will set a 5% per year revenue growth target for two years as a way for SELLERS to receive 100% of their earnout (categorized as "additional transaction value" for contract and tax purposes).

So, for example, the TTM revenues for the period above for purposes of this example are $2,355,000. For a 5% growth rate in year one, the resulting target is $2,415,000 for year one and $2,535,750 in year two. The combined revenue target for the two years post-acquisition is $4,950,750.

Based on a purchase price of $2,355,430, the 25% earnout would be valued at par at $588,857. We can simply back into an earnout payout rate by dividing the par value target of $588,857 by the total targeted revenues of $4.95 million.

The result is a payout rate of 11.89% of the first two years' revenue. If SELLER falls short of the target, they fall short in the payout; if they exceed the amount, they earn a payout premium.

Below are two examples of performance:

Example 1 is the combined two years' revenues total $4.50 million - the resulting two-year payout would be $535,244.

Example 2 is the combined two years' revenues total $5.50 million - the resulting two-year payout would be $654,187.

Comparison and Comments

The buyer's language contained a severe penalty if revenues dropped below 80% of prior levels, the earnout payment goes to $0. Also, they have only a penalty for falling short and no corresponding reward for exceeding expectations. The seller's counter proposal is very specific, formula-driven and uses examples. It will be very hard to misinterpret this language. The seller's language accounts for the punishment of a shortfall with the upside reward of exceeding growth projections. The principle of both proposals is the same - to protect and grow revenue, but the results for the seller are far superior with the counter proposal language.

Sample Working Capital Clause Within an LOI

Buyer's Proposal

This proposal assumes a debt free cash free (DFCF) balance sheet and a normalized level of working capital at closing.

Seller's Counter Proposal

At or around closing, the respective accounting teams will do an analysis of accounts payable and accounts receivable. The seller will retain all receivables in excess of payables plus all cash on cash equivalents. The balance sheet will be assumed by the buyer with a $0 net working capital balance.

Get the Specifics

The buyer's language is vague and a problem waiting to happen. So, for example, if the buyer's experts decide that a "normalized level of working capital" at closing is a surplus of $400,000, the value of the transaction to the seller dropped by $400,000 compared to the seller's counter proposal language. The objective in seller negotiations is to truly understand the value of the various offers before countersigning the LOI. For example, an offer for cash at closing of $4,000,000, with the seller retaining all excess net working capital when the normal level is $800,000, is superior to an offer for $4.4 million with working capital levels retained at normal levels.

These are two very important deal terms and they can move the effective transaction value by large amounts if they are allowed to be loosely worded in the letter of intent and then interpreted to the buyer's advantage in translation to the definitive purchase agreement. Why not just cut off that option with very precise and specific language in the LOI with formulas and examples prior to execution by the seller? The chances of the deal going through to closing will rise dramatically with this relatively easy-to-execute negotiation element.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To view our lists of buyers and sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Grow or Sell Your Information Technology Company - A Crossroads Decision

Thinking of taking your information technology company to the next level with a major marketing campaign or by hiring additional sales resources? These are decisions that can impact your company's future. It might be time to consider the alternative of selling your business.

We are often approached by software company or information technology business owners at a crossroads of taking the company to the next level.  The decision in most cases is whether they should bring on the one or two hot shot sales people or channel development people necessary to bring the company sales to a level that will allow the company to reach critical mass. For a smaller company with sales below $5 million this can be a critical decision.

For frame of reference, prior to embarking on my merger and acquisition advisor career, I spent my prior 20 years in various sales capacities in primarily information technology and computer industry related companies from bag carrying salesman to district, regional, to national sales manager and finally Chief Marketing Officer.  So when I look at a company, it is from the sales and marketing perspective first and foremost. I am sure that if I had a public accounting background, I would look at my clients through those lenses.

So with that backdrop, let's look at what might be a typical situation. The software company is doing $3.5 million in sales, has a good group of loyal customers, produces a nice income for its owner or owners, and has a lot more potential for sales growth in the opinion of the owner. Some light bulb has been lit that suggests that they need to step this up to the next level after relying on word of mouth and the passion and energy of the owner to get to this stage.

I have spoken with more than 30, primarily technology based companies over the years that have faced this exact situation and can count on one hand the ones that had a successful outcome. The natural inclination is to bite the bullet and bring on that expensive resource and hope your staff can keep up with the big influx of orders. The reality is that in most cases the execution was a very expensive failure. Below are several factors that you should consider when you are at this crossroads:

1. The 80 20 rule of salesmen. You know this one. 80% of sales are produced by 20% of the salespeople. If you are only hiring one or two, the likelihood is that you will not get a top performer.
2. The president of the company and decision maker has no sales background so the odds of him making the right hiring decision are greatly diminished. He will not understand how to properly set milestones, judge progress, evaluate performance objectively, or coach the new hire.
3. To hire a good salesman that can handle a complex sale requires a base salary and a draw for at least 6 months that puts him in a better economic condition than he was in on his last job. So you are probably looking at $150,000 annual run rate for a decent candidate.
4. If you have not had a formalized sales effort before, you are probably lacking the sales infrastructure that your new hire is used to. Proper contact management systems, customer and prospect databases, developed collateral materials and sales presentations, sales cycle timeframes and critical milestones and developed competition feature benefit matrixes will need to be developed.
5. Current customers are most likely the early adapters, risk takers, pioneers, etc. and are not afraid of making the buying decision with a small more risky company. These early adaptors, however, are not viewed as good references for the more conservative majority that needs the security of a big company backing their product selection decision.
6. Your new hire is most likely someone that came from a bigger information technology company and may be comfortable performing in an established sales department. It is the rare salesman that can transform from that environment to developing the environment while trying to meet a sales quota. Throw on top of that the objection that he has never had to deal with before, the small company risk factor, and the odds of success diminish. Finally, this transformation from a core group of early adapters to now selling to the conservative majority elongates the sales cycle by 25% to as much as double his prior experience. If you don't fire him first, he will probably quit when his draw runs out.

With all this going against the business owner, most of them go ahead and make the hire and then I hear something like this, "Yes, we brought on a sales guy two years ago who said he had all the industry contacts and in nine months after he hadn't sold a thing and cost us a lot of money, we fired him. That really hurt the company and we have just now recovered. We won't do that again."

What are the alternatives? Certainly strategic alliances, channel partnerships, value added resellers are options, but again the success rate for these arrangements are suspect without the sales background in the executive suite.  A lower risk approach is to outsource your VP of Sales or Chief Marketing Officer function. There are a number of highly experienced and talented free lancers that you can hire on a consulting basis that can help you establish a sales and marketing infrastructure and guide you through the staffing process. That may be the best way to go.

An option that one of our clients chose when faced with the six points to consider from above was to sell his company.  This is a very difficult decision for an entrepreneur who by nature is very optimistic about the future and feels like he can clear any hurdle. This client had no sales background but was a very smart subject matter expert with an outstanding background as a former consultant with a Big 5 accounting firm. He did not make the hiring mistake, but instead went the outsourcing of VP of Sales function as step 1. When their firm wanted to make the transition from the early adapters to the conservative majority, the sales cycle slowed to a crawl. Meanwhile their technology advantage was being eroded by a well funded venture backed competitor that had struck an alliance with a big vendor.

They engaged our firm to find them a buyer, but then we encountered the valuation gap. Our business seller thought his company was worth a great deal and that he should be paid with cash at close for all the future potential his product could deliver. The buyer, on the other hand, wanted to pay based on a trailing twelve months historical perspective and if anything was paid for potential, that would be in the form of an earn out based on post acquisition sales performance.

With a well structured earn out agreement and the right buyer, our client will reach his transaction value goals. His earn out is based on future sales, but his effective sales force has been increased from one (himself) to 27 reps. His install base has been increased from 14 to 800. Every one of the buyer's current customers is a candidate for this product. The small company risk has been removed going from a little known start-up with $500 K in revenues to a well known industry player, publicly traded stock with a market cap of $2.5 billion.

He avoided the big cash drain that a bad sales person hiring decision would have created and he sold his company before a competitor dominated the market and made his technology irrelevant and of minimal value.

My professional contacts sometimes tease me and suggest that I think every company should be sold. That may be a slight exaggeration, but in many instances, a company sale is the best route. When a information technology business owner is faced with that crossroads decision of bringing on a significant sales resource that will be faced with a complex sale and the executive suite does not have the sales background, a company sale may be the best outcome.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To view our lists of buyers and sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

ACHIEVING STRATEGIC VALUE IN A SOFTWARE COMPANY SALE

One of the most challenging aspects of selling an information technology company is coming up with a business valuation. Sometimes the valuations provided by the market (translation – a completed transaction) defy all logic. In other industry segments there are some pretty handy rules of thumb for valuation metrics. In one industry it may be 1 X Revenue, in another it could be 7.5 X EBITDA.

Since it is critical to our business to help our information technology clients maximize their business selling price, I have given this considerable thought. Why are some of these software company valuations so high? It is because of the profitability leverage of technology. A simple example is what is Microsoft’s incremental cost to produce the next copy of Office Professional? It is probably $1.20 for three CD’s and 80 cents for packaging. Let’s say the license cost is $400. The gross margin is north of 99%. That does not happen in manufacturing or services or retail or most other industries.

One problem in selling a small technology company is that they do not have any of the brand name, distribution, or standards leverage that the big companies possess. So, on their own, they cannot create this profitability leverage. The acquiring company, however, does not want to compensate the small seller for the post acquisition results that are directly attributable to the buyer’s market presence. This is what we refer to as the valuation gap.

What we attempt to do is to help the buyer justify paying a much higher price than a pre-acquisition financial valuation of the target company. In other words, we want to get strategic value for our seller. Below are the factors that we use in our analysis:

1. Cost for the buyer to write the code internally – Many years ago, Barry Boehm, in his book, Software Engineering Economics, developed a constructive cost model for projecting the programming costs for writing computer code. He called it the COCOMO model. It was quite detailed and complex, but I have boiled it down and simplified it for our purposes. We have the advantage of estimating the “projects” retrospectively because we already know the number of lines of code comprising our client’s products. In general terms he projected that it takes 3.6 person months to write one thousand SLOC (source lines of code). So if you looked at a senior software engineer at a $70,000 fully loaded compensation package writing a program with 15,000 SLOC, your calculation is as follows – 15 X 3.6 = 54 person months X $5,800 per month = $313,200 divided by 15,000 = $20.88/SLOC.

Before you guys with 1,000,000 million lines of code get too excited about your $20.88 million business value, there are several caveats. Unfortunately the market does not care and will not pay for what it cost you to develop your product. Secondly, this information is designed to help us understand what it might cost the buyer to develop it internally so that he starts his own build versus buy analysis. Thirdly, we have to apply discounts to this analysis if the software is three generations old legacy code, for example. In that case, it is discounted by 90%. You are no longer a technology sale with high profitability leverage. They are essentially acquiring your customer base and the valuation will not be that exciting.

If, however, your application is a brand new application that has legs, start sizing your yacht. Examples of this might be a click fraud application, Pay Pal, or Internet Telephony. The second high value platform would be where your software technology “leap frogs” a popular legacy application. An example of this is when we sold a company that had completely rewritten their legacy distribution management platform for a new vertical market in Microsoft .Net. They leap frogged the dominant player in that space that was supporting multiple green screen solutions. Our client became a compelling strategic acquisition. Fast forward one year and I hear the acquirer is selling one of these $100,000 systems per week. Now that’s leverage!

2. Most acquirers could write the code themselves, but we suggest they analyze the cost of their time to market delay. Believe me, with first mover advantage from a competitor or, worse, customer defections, there is a very real cost of not having your product today. We were able to convince one buyer that they would be able to justify our seller’s entire purchase price based on the number of client defections their acquisition would prevent. As it turned out, the buyer had a huge install base and through multiple prior acquisitions was maintaining six disparate software platforms to deliver essentially the same functionality.

This was very expensive to maintain and they passed those costs on to their disgruntled install base. The buyer had been promising upgrades for a few years, but nothing was delivered. Customers were beginning to sign on with their major competitor. Our pitch to the buyer was to make this acquisition, demonstrate to your client base that you are really providing an upgrade path and give notice of support withdrawal for 4 or 5 of the other platforms. The acquisition was completed and, even though their customers that were contemplating leaving did not immediately upgrade, they did not defect either. Apparently the devil that you know is better than the devil you don’t in the world of information technology.

3. Another arrow in our valuation driving quiver for our sellers is we restate historical financials using the pricing power of the brand name acquirer. We had one client that was a small IT company that had developed a fine piece of software that compared favorably with a large, publicly traded company’s solution. Our product had the same functionality, ease of use, and open systems platform, but there was one very important difference. The end-user customer’s perception of risk was far greater with the little IT company that could be “out of business tomorrow.” We were literally able to double the financial performance of our client on paper and present a compelling argument to the big company buyer that those economics would be immediately available to him post acquisition. It certainly was not GAP Accounting, but it was effective as a tool to drive transaction value.

4. Financials are important so we have to acknowledge this aspect of buyer valuation as well. We generally like to build in a baseline value (before we start adding the strategic value components) of 2 X contractually recurring revenue during the current year. So, for example, if the company has monthly maintenance contracts of $100,000 times 12 months = $1.2 million X 2 = $2.4 million as a baseline company value component. Another component we add is for any contracts that extend beyond one year. We take an estimate of the gross margin produced in the firm contract years beyond year one and assign a 5 X multiple to that and discount it to present value.

Let’s use an example where they had 4 years remaining on a services contract and the last 3 years were $200,000 per year in revenue with approximately 50% gross margin. We would take the final three years of $100,000 annual gross margin and present value it at a 5% discount rate resulting in $265,616. This would be added to the earlier 2 X recurring year 1 revenue from above. Again, this financial analysis is to establish a baseline, before we pile on the strategic value components.

5. We try to assign values for miscellaneous assets that the seller is providing to the buyer. Don’t overlook the strategic value of Blue Chip Accounts. Those accounts become a platform for the buyer’s entire product suite being sold post acquisition into an “installed account.” It is far easier to sell add-on applications and products into an existing account than it is to open up that new account. These strategic accounts can have huge value to a buyer.

6. Finally, we use a customer acquisition cost model to drive value in the eyes of a potential buyer. Let's say that your sales person at 100% of Quota earns total salary and commissions of $125,000 and sells 5 net new accounts. That would mean that your base customer acquisition cost per account was $25,000.  Add a
   20% company overhead for the 85 accounts, for example, and the company value, using this methodology would be $2,550,000.

After reading this you may be saying to yourself, come on, this is a little far-fetched. These components do have real value, but that value is open to a broad interpretation by the marketplace. We are attempting to assign metrics to a very subjective set of components. This discipline allows us to help bring buyer and seller together in productive dialogue to bridge the valuation gap and create a winning transaction.

 


Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To view our lists of buyers and sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

When You Sell Your Software Company Can Have a Big Impact on Your Sale Price

When a large software company makes an acquisition in a particular niche, several other comparable acquisitions soon follow. This article discusses this market dynamic and the importance for owners of similar software companies to reevaluate their exit plans.

Our firm was engaged as a merger and acquisition advisor in 2010 to sell a Content / Document Management Software Firm. We put together a database of likely buyers in that software category and began our contact process. Fast Forward to early 2014. We have been engaged by a second Content / Document Management Firm to sell their software company. From our earlier engagement, we dusted off our database of mid-market software companies in that space and began making our phone calls.

A very interesting thing happened. 40% of these middle market software companies had been acquired by one of the large software companies. We would call one document management software company expecting the receptionist to answer by the company name in our database. Instead, we got, "Thank you for calling OpenText." Next call, instead of the expected company name, we got an EMC Company. Another call and this time, "thank you for calling Oracle." Two calls later, we reach an IBM Company.

Wow. Between mid 2010 and early 2014, there was a buying spree by the enterprise software vendors shoring up their product offering to become a much more comprehensive offering, now called ECM or enterprise content management. It was almost like a heavyweight fight - IBM punches, EMC counters, and Oracle lands a blow while OpenText dodges a punch.

For the midsized software companies in this space, these were exciting times. This rapid consolidation and active buying caused the transaction values to increase rapidly. Once the enterprise companies have added what they needed, however, the buying stops, the market returns to normal and sellers no longer command a premium price. Now the bad news. If you were a mid-sized competitor of the acquired companies, you are now competing with very large, powerful competitors. They will dwarf your company in terms of sales force size, marketing resources, brand awareness and pricing power. Their product now becomes the safe choice in a head-to -head competition with yours.

To now compete effectively will require even more skill. Your firm can continue to provide outstanding service and responsiveness. You can provide the small company customer attention that many customers require. You can be nimble and innovate with new products and features as another way to successfully compete. You often hear the stock market pundits say, "the trend is your friend" or "don't fight the trend." There is a certain wisdom to this sentiment. If you are in a software category that suddenly has become the target for the big software vendors, you may do best to exit according to the market conditions rather than your original retirement schedule.

Actually, the buying company will most likely want you to stay on board for a period of time to transfer customer relationships and intellectual property. So you can take your chips off the table today at an opportune time for rich valuation multiples and then retire a few years later. If you are younger, you can secure your family's financial future, work for the new company for a few years, gain valuable experience and then exit. Now you are ready to launch your next great idea. This time it will be far easier. You will have a large base of resources and influential contacts. Also the venture capital guys might even give you money under reasonable terms. Home Run, touch em all!

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To view our lists of buyers and sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Software Company - How Important is the Sale Process

It is common knowledge that timing is very important when selling a software company in determining the value the owner receives. This article discusses what actually is a far more powerful determinant in selling price - the process employed in selling your software company.

As a general rule, there is a greater variance in company valuations for software and information technology companies than for brick and mortar type companies. If you took a manufacturer of bottle caps out to ten different private equity groups (the most disciplined group of financial buyers), the purchase price offers would be within 10% of each other at around 4.5 X EBITDA.

If you took a software company out to that same group of buyers, their purchase price would still be within 10% of each other at 5.5 X EBITDA. If you located ten software companies that were actively making acquisitions and took the same software company out to them, the offers could vary by over 100%.

I was talking with a financial advisor who related the following story to me about one of his clients that was the owner of a software company. One day the software company owner was approached by a private equity group with an unsolicited offer to buy his company. The two parties executed a confidentiality agreement and exchanged financial statements. Within a very short time the private equity group submitted a qualified letter of intent. The owner was thrilled and told his financial advisor that he was about to sell his company for $10 million.

His financial advisor's alarms sounded and he encouraged his client to engage a mergers and acquisitions firm that specialized in selling software companies. The owner resisted, evidently thinking that the process would be a breeze and that he could avoid the fees of the investment banker. His advisor persisted, however, and after a great deal of persuasion, finally agreed to hire a mergers and acquisitions firm that specialized in software company business sales.

The first concern of the owner was that hiring an investment banker would somehow upset the buyer and jeopardize this lucrative offer. The investment banker explained to the seller that he should contact the buyer and explain that since this was his first experience at selling a business so he was going to engage an advisor that could help him with the process. The owner instructed the buyer to work through his investment banker from this point forward.

The software investment banker included this identified buyer in his mix of other private equity groups and a large list of software company strategic buyers. This software was in a niche that was getting a lot of play lately as big legacy providers were being supplanted by smaller, more nimble new comers that were delivering their SaaS solution through the cloud.

As a result of the mergers and acquisitions Advisor's efforts, thirty potential buyers executed confidentiality agreements and reviewed the memorandum. From that group, twenty firms dropped out of the process after reviewing the memorandum, but ten interested buyers remained. Those ten then had conference calls with the owners and three completed a buyer visit.

After the company visits, all three companies started working on qualified Letters of Intent. This is a non-binding letter that basically says that if we complete our due diligence process and do not uncover any negative surprises, we are willing to pay XX amount for your company under the following terms (define an earn out, seller notes, owner continuing obligations, etc.). The serious negotiations come at the letter of intent stage because once the owner counter signs the LOI, the buyer is granted a quiet period in order to perform his due diligence. This means that the investment banker is precluded from soliciting any other offers during this period.

The seller and his software investment banker were able to be more demanding in the negotiations because they knew that they had the original unsolicited offer in hand as well as three very qualified strategic buyers that were willing to negotiate a letter of intent. Fast forward thirty days and the seller countersigned the LOI from one of the strategic buyers with a total transaction value of $120 million.
This was 12 times the original unsolicited offer. Quick disclaimer here like on the TV diet commercials, your results may differ.

This is an extreme example, but we have seen it play out many times. Our firm has been engaged to consult with several software companies that have been approached with an unsolicited offer. Maybe offer is not the right word, so let's say they were approached with interest from a buyer. We were brought in because the business owner could not get the potential suitor to actually make an offer.

They were circling, asking numerous questions, kicking the tires, and maintaining a dialogue with the would-be seller, but were not coming up with any terms and conditions for a potential offer. This is no man's land for the seller. We have been engaged to move the process forward or to stop this endless brain drain. We advise the owners to let us be the bad cop and not to take on that role themselves because it is important to preserve their relationship with the suitor as a potential reseller, channel partner or business development resource.

When we force the issue with the potential buyer, more often than not we find out that their intentions all along were to buy this high growth, cutting edge software company for an EBITDA multiple. Needless to say, our client is disappointed because he was already sizing his yacht. He was envisioning the lofty valuations that he had read about in a recent acquisition by a marquee industry player.

There is absolutely no reason for the single buyer to offer anything other than a "justifiable" EBITDA multiple offer as long as he has no competition in the process.

Compare this to HP or Dell making an unsolicited offer for a publicly traded, cloud enabled, virtualization software company as they did recently. They started out at a 30% premium to the current stock price and know that the target company will hire a Wall Street investment banker to maximize their transaction value. This public company buying process is, by law, a very public and transparent process. In an offer for a private company, however, it is a very private process. The seller does not want his customers, employees, or his competition to know that his company is in play.

Opportunistic buyers understand this dynamic and try to exploit it. We tell our clients that they should not feel so special because these buyers are doing the same dance with multiple target companies simultaneously. It is like the real estate guru who wrote the book and gives the classes to buyers to go out to 100 home sellers and offer a really low price and maybe one will take it.

We recently experienced this phenomenon directly. We were brought in to flesh out an unsolicited approach on an IBM iSeries partner software company who had been approached by a private equity consolidator in that space. When our client provided the buyer contact information, we recognized it immediately because we had completed an engagement with a similar target company six months earlier. They circled but did not offer. When we forced their hand, lo and behold it was an EBITDA financial offer. This dance was ended quickly and our client returned to managing and growing their business.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To view our lists of buyers and sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

How Accurate are Software Company Valuations?

Software company owners looking to sell their companies are often inspired to start the process after reading about the latest high profile, stratospheric acquisition price paid by a large tech bell weather company. The transaction metrics, i.e. transaction value to sales or transaction value to EBIT sometimes defy all logic.

The new, would-be seller applies these metrics to his company’s sales and EBIT and determines that IBM, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, Cisco, etc. should be ready to get into a bidding war over his $5 million in revenue, game changing, best in breed software company for a value of 8 X revenue.

Let’s break down the methodology that professional business valuation firms use as their standard in arriving at a company’s indicated value. Their approach calls for a triangulation of three valuation methodologies.

The first is a comparison to publicly traded companies in the same category. It is very interesting to look at the lists that the valuators come up with. Technically they are all software companies with SIC Code 5734-01, but they are as alike as apples, coconuts, watermelons, and blueberries. True, they are all fruit, but that is where the similarity ends.

Next, they take the valuation metrics of these publicly traded companies. The most commonly used are sales to enterprise value and EBIT to enterprise value. Next they come up with the median value (1/2 of the companies are above the value and ½ are below). They then apply what I can best describe as an arbitrary discount factor to account for the value differential between public companies and small, closely held companies. They come up with their adjusted metrics then apply them to the target company and voila, you have one of the valuation legs completed.

The valuation analyst next applies the same approach to actual completed transactions. If the buyer was a public company then the metrics are publicly available. If the transaction is between two privately held companies, the metrics are only available on a voluntary basis. Maybe 10%of these participants release information about these transactions. These unreported deals are probably the best fit in terms of comparables.

In order to get a meaningful number of transactions, the analyst often is forced to use transactions from a 5-10 year period. Do you know how to say Tech Bubble/Tech Meltdown? Wow, this isn’t sounding quite as scientific as I originally thought.

Wait, maybe we can add some needed precision with the third valuation technique, the discounted cash flow method. My Wharton Finance Professor would be so proud. First they calculate a risk adjusted discount rate. After three pages of explanation, they usually arrive at a discount rate of between 24-30%. They next project the after tax cash flow for the next five years and discount it to present value.

They then calculate the terminal value of the company (five years of year five cash flow discounted by the risk adjusted rate less the projected growth rate). They discount that number to present value and add that to the discounted cash flow to create the third leg of the valuation stool.

How many software companies are not projecting hockey stick growth during the valuation period in question? Not only are these projections very aggressive, but cash flow margins are projected to improve by a factor of three times during this same period.

Now our seller is armed and dangerous with his company’s value. That becomes his minimal acceptable offer and it must all be in cash at closing. To use a Wall Street term – this company is priced for perfection. We often discover during a sell-side engagement that these projections are not just missed, but they are missed by a large margin. In spite of this, the seller’s valuation expectations remain the same.

All is not lost, however. One of the unique aspects of selling a software company is that if the technology is fresh (think SaaS, Mobile Apps, Virtualization, Cloud Computing) financial multiples are often not the driving force in the buyer’s valuation equation.

One thing that we have learned in the representation of software companies for sale is that the value is subject to broad interpretation by the market. We find that strategic buyers in this space are driven by such considerations as first mover advantage, time to market, development costs, customer acquisition costs, customer defections, and enhancing an existing product suite.

The better the target company addresses these issues, the greater the post acquisition value creation potential. If the right buyer is located and recognizes the seller’s potential when integrated with the new owner’s distribution channel and customer base, we may find an even bigger hockey stick then our very optimistic sellers. If two or three buyers recognize a similar dynamic, then the valuations can become very exciting.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. To view our lists of buyers and sellers click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Software Company - Market Timing is Critical

When a large software company makes an acquisition in a particular niche, several other comparable acquisitions soon follow. This post discusses this market dynamic and the importance for owners of similar software companies to reevaluate their exit plans.

Our firm was engaged as a merger and acquisition advisor in 2007 to sell a Content / Document Management Software Firm. We put together a database of likely buyers in that software category and began our contact process. Fast Forward to early 2010. We have been engaged by a second Content / Document Management Firm to sell their software company. From our earlier engagement, we dusted off our database of mid-market software companies in that space and began making our phone calls.

A very interesting thing happened. 40% of these middle market software companies had been acquired by one of the large software companies. We would call one document management software company expecting the receptionist to answer by the company name in our database. Instead, we got, "Thank you for calling OpenText." Next call, instead of the expected company name, we got an EMC Company. Another call and this time, "thank you for calling Oracle." Two calls later, we reach an IBM Company.

Wow. Between mid 2007 and early 2010, there was a buying spree by the enterprise software vendors shoring up their product offering to become a much more comprehensive offering, now called ECM or enterprise content management. It was almost like a heavyweight fight - IBM punches, EMC counters, and Oracle lands a blow while OpenText dodges a punch.

For the midsized software companies in this space, these were exciting times. This rapid consolidation and active buying caused the transaction values to increase rapidly. Once the enterprise companies have added what they needed, however, the buying stops, the market returns to normal and sellers no longer command a premium price.

Now the bad news. If you were a mid-sized competitor of the acquired companies, you are now competing with very large, powerful competitors. They will dwarf your company in terms of sales force size, marketing resources, brand awareness and pricing power. Their product now becomes the safe choice in a head-to -head competition with yours.

To now compete effectively will require even more skill. Your firm can continue to provide outstanding service and responsiveness. You can provide the small company customer attention that many customers require. You can be nimble and innovate with new products and features as another way to successfully compete.

You often hear the stock market pundits say, “the trend is your friend" or "don't fight the trend." There is a certain wisdom to this sentiment. If you are in a software category that suddenly has become the target for the big software vendors, you may do best to exit according to the market conditions rather than your original retirement schedule.

Actually, the buying company will most likely want you to stay on board for a period of time to transfer customer relationships and intellectual property. So you can take your chips off the table today at an opportune time for rich valuation multiples and then retire a few years later.

If you are younger, you can secure your family's financial future, work for the new company for a few years, gain valuable experience and then exit. Now you are ready to launch your next great idea. This time it will be far easier. You will have a large base of resources and influential contacts. Also the venture capital guys might even give you money under reasonable terms. Home Run, touch em all!

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

MidMarket Capital’s Annual Information Technology Merger & Acquisition Trends Survey

We are requesting survey input from CEO’s and Directors of Mergers and Acquisitions across a broad cross section of software, IT services, and Information Technology, (Approximately 6,000 are being asked to participate).

We will send the survey results out to all respondents. The 7 questions will take 2 minutes to complete. Please cut and paste this link into your browser to take the survey http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/X5SWMPK

Thank you in advance for your participation.
Dave



Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Software Company- The Number One Value Driver

When helping our clients sell their software companies, we get to witness buyer behavior first hand. The most important behavior is their economic vote - how much they are willing to pay for a business. Many factors go into their assessment of value, but a contractually recurring revenue stream is consistently the number one value driver.

Why is contractually recurring revenue so important? The first answer is risk. Buying a business is risky. Any factor that reduces this risk is rewarded with transaction value. Forecasted sales, for example, are at the high end of the risk scale and are heavily discounted in value. Historical time and materials revenues that are "most likely to be at about the same level" next year are somewhere in the middle of the risk scale and are valued accordingly.The owner and key employees may leave after the acquisition and may take their customer relationships and accounts with them.

Those customers locked into contracts are less likely to leave. The acquisition can temporarily inject uncertainty into the marketplace and cause disruption or delays in pending sales situations. The integration efforts will introduce execution risk into previously routine revenue generating activities.The acquiring company wants the existing customers to stay put long enough to get comfortable with the new company. Contracts with plenty of time remaining are their security.How can you use this knowledge to your advantage?

Go on a mission to convert every time and materials revenue source you can to an annual contract. If you are a software company, for example, and you have customers that are not on an 18% - 20% annual maintenance contract, get those customers converted. A strategy might be a one time "get current sale" in return for signing an annual maintenance contract. Services companies should review their T&M records with their regular customers and devise programs that convert those to annual fixed price programs. Equipment dealers come up with your own extended warranty programs. Services firms devise a concept where you provide departmental or functional outsourcing for your clients.

Financials are important so we have to acknowledge this aspect of buyer valuation as well. We generally like to build in a baseline value (before we start adding the strategic value components) of 2 X contractually recurring revenue during the current year. So, for example, if the company has monthly maintenance contracts of $100,000 times 12 months = $1.2 million X 2 = $2.4 million as a baseline company value component. Another component we add is for any contracts that extend beyond one year.

We take an estimate of the gross margin produced in the firm contract years beyond year one and assign a 5 X multiple to that and discount it to present value. Let's use an example where they had 4 years remaining on a services contract and the last 3 years were $200,000 per year in revenue with approximately 50% gross margin. We would take the final three years of $100,000 annual gross margin and present value it at a 5% discount rate resulting in $265,616. This would be added to the earlier 2 X recurring year one revenue from above. Again, this financial analysis is to establish a baseline, before we pile on the strategic value components.

On a value scale, contractually recurring revenue is a 10, expected historical revenue is a 6 and a sales pipeline is a 3. Move your 3's and 6's to 10's and recognize a big boost in your business selling price.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Software Company- Why Use a Merger and Acquisitions Advisor?

Business valuations for software companies are at best a mathematical estimate. If you are selling your software company, the only way to be certain that you have gotten a fair price is to conduct a soft auction process where competing companies establish the market value.



Perhaps the most important business transaction you will ever pursue is the sale of your software company. Many business owners attempt to do it themselves and when asked if they got a good deal, many respond with "I think so," or "I got my asking price," or "I really don't know," or "It was a disaster." Often times these very capable business people approach the sale of their business with less formality than in the sale of a home.



The purpose of this post is to answer the questions - Why would I use a Merger and Acquisitions Advisor and what am I getting for the fees I will pay?



1. Confidentiality. If an owner tries to sell his own software business, that process alone reveals to the world that his business is for sale. Employees, customers, suppliers, and bankers all get nervous and competitors get predatory. The Merger and Acquisitions Advisor protects the identity of the company he represents for sale with a process designed to contact only owner approved buyers with a blind profile- a document describing the company without revealing its identity. In order for the buyer to gain access to any sensitive information he must sign a confidentiality agreement. That generally eliminates the tire kickers and deters behaviors detrimental to the seller's business.



2. Business Continuity. Selling a software company is a full time job. The business owner is already performing multiple functions instrumental to the success of his company. By taking on the load of selling his business, many of those essential functions will get less attention, sometimes causing irreparable damage to the business. The owner must maintain focus on running his business at its full potential while it is being sold.



3. Time to Close. Since the function of a software business broker is to sell a software company, he has a much better chance of closing a transaction faster than the owner. The faster the sale, the lower the risk of business erosion, customer defection, employee problems and predatory competition.



4. Large Universe of Buyers. Software business brokers subscribe to databases of software companies that enable them to screen for buyers that are in a certain SIC Code and have revenues that would support the potential acquisition. In addition, they maintain databases of high net worth individual buyers and have access to private equity groups' databases that outline their buying criteria.



5. Marketing. A business broker can help present the software company in its best light to maximize selling price. He understands how to recast financials to recognize the EBITDA potential post acquisition. Higher EBITDA = higher selling price. He understands the key value drivers for buyers and can help the owner identify changes that translate into enhanced selling price.



6. Valuation Knowledge. The value of a business is far more difficult to ascertain than the value of a house. Every software company is unique and has hundreds of variables that effect value. Business brokers have access to business transaction databases, but those should be used as guidelines or reference points. The best way for a business owner to truly feel comfortable that he got the best deal is to have several financially viable parties bidding for his business. An industry database may indicate the value of your software company based on certain valuation multiples, but the market provides the real answer. An industry database, for example, cannot put a value to a particular buyer on a key customer relationship or a proprietary technology. Most business owners that act as their own business broker get only one buyer involved- either another business that approaches him with an unsolicited offer or a referral from his banker, accountant, or outside attorney. Just look at the additional billion plus dollars of value created for MCI shareholders because of the competitive bidding between Verizon and Quest Communications.



7. Balance of Experience. Most corporate buyers have acquired multiple businesses while sellers usually have only one sale. In one situation we represented a first-time seller being pursued by a buyer with 26 previous acquisitions. Buyers want the lowest price and the most favorable terms. The inexperienced seller will be negotiating in the dark. To every term and condition in the buyer's favor the buyer will respond with, "that is standard practice" or "that is the market" or "this is how we did it in ten other deals." By engaging a business broker, the seller has an advocate with a similar experience base to help preserve the seller's transaction value and structure.



8. Maximize the Value of Seller's Outside Professionals. Business brokers can save the seller significantly on professional hourly fees by managing several important functions leading up to contract. His compensation is usually comprised of a reasonable monthly fee plus a success fee that is a percentage of the transaction value. The business broker and seller negotiate with the buyer the business terms of the transaction (sale price, down payment, seller financing, etc.) prior to turning the purchase agreement over to outside counsel for legal review. In the absence of the business broker that sometimes-exhaustive negotiation process would default to the outside attorney. It is not his area of expertise and could result in significant hourly fees.



9. Maintain Buyer-Seller Relationship. The sale of a software company is an emotional process and can become contentious. The business broker acts as a buffer between the buyer and seller. This not only improves the likelihood of the transaction closing, but helps preserve a healthy buyer- seller relationship post closing. Often buyers want sellers to have a portion of their transaction value contingent on the successful performance of the company post closing. Buyer and seller need to be on the same team after closing.



Our experiences with businesses that engaged our firm as a result of an unsolicited offer from a buyer have been quite instructive. The eventual selling price averaged over 20% higher than the first offer. In no case was the business sold at the initial price. To conclude, the business broker helps reduce the risk of business erosion with improved confidentiality while allowing the owner to focus on running the business. The business broker led sale helps maximize sales proceeds by involving a large universe of buyers in a competitive bidding process. Finally, the business broker can improve the likelihood that the sale closes by buffering buyer-seller negotiations and by balancing the experience scales.



Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital