MidMarket Capital’s Annual Information Technology Merger & Acquisition Trends Survey

We are requesting survey input from CEO’s and Directors of Mergers and Acquisitions across a broad cross section of software, IT services, and Information Technology, (Approximately 6,000 are being asked to participate).

We will send the survey results out to all respondents. The 7 questions will take 2 minutes to complete. Please cut and paste this link into your browser to take the survey http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/X5SWMPK

Thank you in advance for your participation.
Dave



Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Software Company- The Number One Value Driver

When helping our clients sell their software companies, we get to witness buyer behavior first hand. The most important behavior is their economic vote - how much they are willing to pay for a business. Many factors go into their assessment of value, but a contractually recurring revenue stream is consistently the number one value driver.

Why is contractually recurring revenue so important? The first answer is risk. Buying a business is risky. Any factor that reduces this risk is rewarded with transaction value. Forecasted sales, for example, are at the high end of the risk scale and are heavily discounted in value. Historical time and materials revenues that are "most likely to be at about the same level" next year are somewhere in the middle of the risk scale and are valued accordingly.The owner and key employees may leave after the acquisition and may take their customer relationships and accounts with them.

Those customers locked into contracts are less likely to leave. The acquisition can temporarily inject uncertainty into the marketplace and cause disruption or delays in pending sales situations. The integration efforts will introduce execution risk into previously routine revenue generating activities.The acquiring company wants the existing customers to stay put long enough to get comfortable with the new company. Contracts with plenty of time remaining are their security.How can you use this knowledge to your advantage?

Go on a mission to convert every time and materials revenue source you can to an annual contract. If you are a software company, for example, and you have customers that are not on an 18% - 20% annual maintenance contract, get those customers converted. A strategy might be a one time "get current sale" in return for signing an annual maintenance contract. Services companies should review their T&M records with their regular customers and devise programs that convert those to annual fixed price programs. Equipment dealers come up with your own extended warranty programs. Services firms devise a concept where you provide departmental or functional outsourcing for your clients.

Financials are important so we have to acknowledge this aspect of buyer valuation as well. We generally like to build in a baseline value (before we start adding the strategic value components) of 2 X contractually recurring revenue during the current year. So, for example, if the company has monthly maintenance contracts of $100,000 times 12 months = $1.2 million X 2 = $2.4 million as a baseline company value component. Another component we add is for any contracts that extend beyond one year.

We take an estimate of the gross margin produced in the firm contract years beyond year one and assign a 5 X multiple to that and discount it to present value. Let's use an example where they had 4 years remaining on a services contract and the last 3 years were $200,000 per year in revenue with approximately 50% gross margin. We would take the final three years of $100,000 annual gross margin and present value it at a 5% discount rate resulting in $265,616. This would be added to the earlier 2 X recurring year one revenue from above. Again, this financial analysis is to establish a baseline, before we pile on the strategic value components.

On a value scale, contractually recurring revenue is a 10, expected historical revenue is a 6 and a sales pipeline is a 3. Move your 3's and 6's to 10's and recognize a big boost in your business selling price.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Selling Your Software Company- Why Use a Merger and Acquisitions Advisor?

Business valuations for software companies are at best a mathematical estimate. If you are selling your software company, the only way to be certain that you have gotten a fair price is to conduct a soft auction process where competing companies establish the market value.



Perhaps the most important business transaction you will ever pursue is the sale of your software company. Many business owners attempt to do it themselves and when asked if they got a good deal, many respond with "I think so," or "I got my asking price," or "I really don't know," or "It was a disaster." Often times these very capable business people approach the sale of their business with less formality than in the sale of a home.



The purpose of this post is to answer the questions - Why would I use a Merger and Acquisitions Advisor and what am I getting for the fees I will pay?



1. Confidentiality. If an owner tries to sell his own software business, that process alone reveals to the world that his business is for sale. Employees, customers, suppliers, and bankers all get nervous and competitors get predatory. The Merger and Acquisitions Advisor protects the identity of the company he represents for sale with a process designed to contact only owner approved buyers with a blind profile- a document describing the company without revealing its identity. In order for the buyer to gain access to any sensitive information he must sign a confidentiality agreement. That generally eliminates the tire kickers and deters behaviors detrimental to the seller's business.



2. Business Continuity. Selling a software company is a full time job. The business owner is already performing multiple functions instrumental to the success of his company. By taking on the load of selling his business, many of those essential functions will get less attention, sometimes causing irreparable damage to the business. The owner must maintain focus on running his business at its full potential while it is being sold.



3. Time to Close. Since the function of a software business broker is to sell a software company, he has a much better chance of closing a transaction faster than the owner. The faster the sale, the lower the risk of business erosion, customer defection, employee problems and predatory competition.



4. Large Universe of Buyers. Software business brokers subscribe to databases of software companies that enable them to screen for buyers that are in a certain SIC Code and have revenues that would support the potential acquisition. In addition, they maintain databases of high net worth individual buyers and have access to private equity groups' databases that outline their buying criteria.



5. Marketing. A business broker can help present the software company in its best light to maximize selling price. He understands how to recast financials to recognize the EBITDA potential post acquisition. Higher EBITDA = higher selling price. He understands the key value drivers for buyers and can help the owner identify changes that translate into enhanced selling price.



6. Valuation Knowledge. The value of a business is far more difficult to ascertain than the value of a house. Every software company is unique and has hundreds of variables that effect value. Business brokers have access to business transaction databases, but those should be used as guidelines or reference points. The best way for a business owner to truly feel comfortable that he got the best deal is to have several financially viable parties bidding for his business. An industry database may indicate the value of your software company based on certain valuation multiples, but the market provides the real answer. An industry database, for example, cannot put a value to a particular buyer on a key customer relationship or a proprietary technology. Most business owners that act as their own business broker get only one buyer involved- either another business that approaches him with an unsolicited offer or a referral from his banker, accountant, or outside attorney. Just look at the additional billion plus dollars of value created for MCI shareholders because of the competitive bidding between Verizon and Quest Communications.



7. Balance of Experience. Most corporate buyers have acquired multiple businesses while sellers usually have only one sale. In one situation we represented a first-time seller being pursued by a buyer with 26 previous acquisitions. Buyers want the lowest price and the most favorable terms. The inexperienced seller will be negotiating in the dark. To every term and condition in the buyer's favor the buyer will respond with, "that is standard practice" or "that is the market" or "this is how we did it in ten other deals." By engaging a business broker, the seller has an advocate with a similar experience base to help preserve the seller's transaction value and structure.



8. Maximize the Value of Seller's Outside Professionals. Business brokers can save the seller significantly on professional hourly fees by managing several important functions leading up to contract. His compensation is usually comprised of a reasonable monthly fee plus a success fee that is a percentage of the transaction value. The business broker and seller negotiate with the buyer the business terms of the transaction (sale price, down payment, seller financing, etc.) prior to turning the purchase agreement over to outside counsel for legal review. In the absence of the business broker that sometimes-exhaustive negotiation process would default to the outside attorney. It is not his area of expertise and could result in significant hourly fees.



9. Maintain Buyer-Seller Relationship. The sale of a software company is an emotional process and can become contentious. The business broker acts as a buffer between the buyer and seller. This not only improves the likelihood of the transaction closing, but helps preserve a healthy buyer- seller relationship post closing. Often buyers want sellers to have a portion of their transaction value contingent on the successful performance of the company post closing. Buyer and seller need to be on the same team after closing.



Our experiences with businesses that engaged our firm as a result of an unsolicited offer from a buyer have been quite instructive. The eventual selling price averaged over 20% higher than the first offer. In no case was the business sold at the initial price. To conclude, the business broker helps reduce the risk of business erosion with improved confidentiality while allowing the owner to focus on running the business. The business broker led sale helps maximize sales proceeds by involving a large universe of buyers in a competitive bidding process. Finally, the business broker can improve the likelihood that the sale closes by buffering buyer-seller negotiations and by balancing the experience scales.



Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital

Sell Your Software Company - The Art of Business Valuation

One of the most challenging aspects of selling a software company is coming up with a business valuation. Sometimes the valuations provided by the market (translation - a completed transaction) defy all logic. In other industry segments there are some pretty handy rules of thumb for valuation metrics. In one industry it may be 1 X Revenue, in another it could be 7.5 X EBITDA.

Since it is critical to our business to help our information technology clients maximize their business selling price, I have given this considerable thought. Why are some of these software company valuations so high? It is because of the profitability leverage of technology?
A simple example is what is Microsoft's incremental cost to produce the next copy of Office Professional? It is probably $1.20 for three CD's and 80 cents for packaging. Let's say the license cost is $400. The gross margin is north of 99%. That does not happen in manufacturing or services or retail or most other industries.

One problem in selling a small technology company is that they do not have any of the brand name, distribution, or standards leverage that the big companies possess. So, on their own, they cannot create this profitability leverage. The acquiring company, however, does not want to compensate the small seller for the post acquisition results that are directly attributable to the buyer's market presence. This is what we refer to as the valuation gap.

What we attempt to do is to help the buyer justify paying a much higher price than a pre-acquisition financial valuation of the target company. In other words, we want to get strategic value for our seller. Below are the factors that we use in our analysis:

1. Cost for the buyer to write the code internally - Many years ago, Barry Boehm, in his book, Software Engineering Economics, developed a constructive cost model for projecting the programming costs for writing computer code. He called it the COCOMO model. It was quite detailed and complex, but I have boiled it down and simplified it for our purposes.

We have the advantage of estimating the projects retrospectively because we already know the number of lines of code comprising our client's products. In general terms he projected that it takes 3.6 person months to write one thousand SLOC (source lines of code). So if you looked at a senior software engineer at a $70,000 fully loaded compensation package writing a program with 15,000 SLOC, your calculation is as follows - 15 X 3.6 = 54 person months X $5,800 per month = $313,200 divided by 15,000 = $20.88/SLOC.

Before you guys with 1,000,000 million lines of code get too excited about your $20.88 million business value, there are several caveats. Unfortunately the market does not care and will not pay for what it cost you to develop your product.

Secondly, this information is designed to help us understand what it might cost the buyer to develop it internally so that he starts his own build versus buy analysis. Thirdly, we have to apply discounts to this analysis if the software is three generations old legacy code, for example. In that case, it is discounted by 90%. You are no longer a technology sale with high profitability leverage. They are essentially acquiring your customer base and the valuation will not be that exciting.

If, however, your application is a brand new application that has legs, start sizing your yacht. Examples of this might be a click fraud application, Pay Pal, or Internet Telephony. The second high value platform would be where your software technology "leap frogs" a popular legacy application.

An example of this is when we sold a company that had completely rewritten their legacy distribution management platform for a new vertical market in Microsoft's latest platform. They leap frogged the dominant player in that space that was supporting multiple green screen solutions. Our client became a compelling strategic acquisition. Fast forward one year and I hear the acquirer is selling one of these $100,000 systems per week. Now that's leverage!

2. Most acquirers could write the code themselves, but we suggest they analyze the cost of their time to market delay. Believe me, with first mover advantage from a competitor or, worse, customer defections, there is a very real cost of not having your product today.

We were able to convince one buyer that they would be able to justify our seller's entire purchase price based on the number of client defections their acquisition would prevent. As it turned out, the buyer had a huge install base and through multiple prior acquisitions was maintaining six disparate software platforms to deliver essentially the same functionality.
This was very expensive to maintain and they passed those costs on to their disgruntled install base. The buyer had been promising upgrades for a few years, but nothing was delivered. Customers were beginning to sign on with their major competitor.

Our pitch to the buyer was to make this acquisition, demonstrate to your client base that you are really providing an upgrade path and give notice of support withdrawal for 4 or 5 of the other platforms. The acquisition was completed and, even though their customers that were contemplating leaving did not immediately upgrade, they did not defect either. Apparently the devil that you know is better than the devil you don't in the world of information technology.

3. Another arrow in our valuation driving quiver for our sellers is we restate historical financials using the pricing power of the brand name acquirer. We had one client that was a small IT company that had developed a fine piece of software that compared favorably with a large, publicly traded company's solution. Our product had the same functionality, ease of use, and open systems platform, but there was one very important difference.

The end-user customer's perception of risk was far greater with the little IT company that could be "out of business tomorrow." We were literally able to double the financial performance of our client on paper and present a compelling argument to the big company buyer that those economics would be immediately available to him post acquisition. It certainly was not GAP Accounting, but it was effective as a tool to drive transaction value.

4. Financials are important so we have to acknowledge this aspect of buyer valuation as well. We generally like to build in a baseline value (before we start adding the strategic value components) of 2 X contractually recurring revenue during the current year.
So, for example, if the company has monthly maintenance contracts of $100,000 times 12 months = $1.2 million X 2 = $2.4 million as a baseline company value component. Another component we add is for any contracts that extend beyond one year. We take an estimate of the gross margin produced in the firm contract years beyond year one and assign a 5 X multiple to that and discount it to present value.

Let's use an example where they had 4 years remaining on a services contract and the last 3 years were $200,000 per year in revenue with approximately 50% gross margin. We would take the final tree years of $100,000 annual gross margin and present value it at a 5% discount rate resulting in $265,616. This would be added to the earlier 2 X recurring year 1 revenue from above. Again, this financial analysis is to establish a baseline, before we pile on the strategic value components.

5. We try to assign values for miscellaneous assets that the seller is providing to the buyer. Don't overlook the strategic value of Blue Chip Accounts. Those accounts become a platform for the buyer's entire product suite being sold post acquisition into an installed account. It is far easier to sell add-on applications and products into an existing account than it is to open up that new account. These strategic accounts can have huge value to a buyer.

6. Finally, we use a customer acquisition cost model to drive value in the eyes of a potential buyer. Let's say that your sales person at 100% of Quota earns total salary and commissions of $125,000 and sells 5 net new accounts. That would mean that your base customer acquisition cost per account was $25,000. Add a 20% company overhead for the 85 accounts, for example, and the company value, using this methodology would be $2,550,000.

After reading this you may be saying to yourself, come on, this is a little far fetched. These components do have real value, but that value is open to a broad interpretation by the marketplace. We are attempting to assign metrics to a very subjective set of components. The buyers are smart, and experienced in the M&A process and quite frankly, they try to deflect these artistic approaches to driving up their financial outlay.

The best leverage point we have is that those buyers know that we are presenting the same analysis to their competitors and they don't know which component or components of value that we have presented will resonate with their competition. In the final analysis, we are just trying to provide the buyers some reasonable explanation for their board of directors to justify paying 8 X revenues for an acquisition.

Dave Kauppi is a Merger and Acquisition Advisor and Managing Director of MidMarket Capital, providing business broker and investment banking services to owners in the sale of information technology companies. For more information about exit planning and selling a business, click to visit our Web Site MidMarket Capital